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I. CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR RULES
Procedures have been devised by various state legislatures in recent
years aimed at establishing limitations on the rule making authority of
administrative agencies. They provide that an agency's rules cannot
take effect until they have been approved by an officer or agency which
is not connected with the agency adopting the rule. "This is the so-
called clearance stage in the rule making process and takes a variety
of forms. It is another technique designed to check unlimited ad-
ministrative discretion.
A. GENERAL PRACTICES IN WISCONSIN
One form of clearance requirement provides that a rule cannot
become effective until it has been submitted to the attorney general
for his approval.' While no law in Wisconsin requires any agency
to submit its rules to the Attorney General, 2 at least one agency, it will
* This is the third and final article of a series written by Mr. Boles on the re-
vised Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act with particular regard to the
Conservation Commission. The first and second articles appearedhin the Spring
and Fall issues of the Marquette Law Review for 1956.
** B.S., M.S., University of Wisconsin; Research Assistant, Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Council, 1953-1955; Research Associate, Wisconsin Conservation Depart-
ment, 1955; Assistant Professor of Government, Iowa State College, 1955,
Author of WIscoNsIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT ON HIGHER ED-
UCATION.
The statutes of 10 states-Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and Tennessee-contain
such requirements. For the text of these provisions see: Preliminary Report
to the 1953 Legislature by the Special Joint Committee on Administrative Rule
Making, WIscoNsIN LEGISLATrVE COUNCIL, May 20, 1953, Appendix D. For a
general discussion of clearance by the Attorney General see: Note, Veto of
Agency Rules, 2 DRAxE L. Rxv. 35 (1952).
2 For that matter, there is no general law in Wisconsin requiring clearance by
an agency. See: Preliminary Report to the 1953 Legislature by the Special
Joint Committee on Administrative Rule Making, May 20, 1953, p. 25. For a
general discussion of clearance provisions see: Note, Independent Review of
Administrative Agency Determinations in the States, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 108
(1953).
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be pointed out, has adopted this procedure on its own initiative. An-
other type of clearance requirement provides that a rule cannot be
effective until approved by the governor.3 A slight modification on
this approach permits the governor to suspend the effective date of a
rule pending a further hearing on complaints he may have received.
Both of these procedures are provided for by statutes dealing with
specific agencies in Wisconsin,4 although there is no general statute
to this effect. The legislature is another body used through which to
clear rules before they become effective.5
While Wisconsin has had limited experience with legislative clear-
ance of rules, an enactment of 1951 provides that any general code
covering a particular subject adopted by the Board of Health or De-
partment of Agriculture must be submitted to the Governor 30 days
in advance of its proposed effective date.6 If any taxpayer complains
to the Governor in writing concerning such a rule, the Governor is
authorized to suspend the effective date of the rule until such a time
as the rule is approved by the Legislature.
In 1953, however, the powers of the Legislature over administra-
tive rules were considerably enhanced by an enactment which author-
ized the Legislature to invalidate rules by joint resolution.7 The con-
stitutionality of this provision was questioned during the hearings of
the Legislative Council Committee on Administrative Rule Making
and the Committee requested an Attorney General's ruling on the
matter. In an opinion issued December 28, 1954, the Attorney General
ruled that the Legislature cannot by joint resolution constitutionally
invalidate a rule which has been duly adopted by an administrative
agency." Such a procedure, the Attorney General felt, would be con-
3 Maryland is the only state that requires all rules to be approved by the gover-
nor. See: Preliminary Report to the 1953 Legislature by the Special Joint
Committee on Administrative Rule Making, May 20, 1953, Appendix D.
4 For a discussion of clearance by the Governor as it affects specific agencies in
Wisconsin see: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, INTERIm REPORT ON ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, No. I and II; WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955
Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, Dec. 1954, pp. 63-64.
5Five States-Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska and South Carolina-
provide that any rule may be disapproved by the legislature. For the text of
these statutes see: Preliminary Report of the 1953 Legislature by the Special
Joint Committee on Administrative Rule Making, May 20, 1953, Appendix D.
See also: B. Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules, 30 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1031 (1955) ; Note, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules 41. COL.
L. REv. 946 (1941) ; Note, Laying on the Table-A Device for Legislative Con-
trol over Delegated Powers, 65 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1952); R. M. Rieser, Leg-
islature Studies Administrative Rule Making, 28 WIs. B. BULL. 25 (1955).
6 WIs. LAWS 1951, c. 653, which became WIs. STATS. (1953) §14.225.
7 Wis. LAWS 1953, c. 331. This became WIs. STATS. (1953) §227.031.
843 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 350 (1954). Even if a separate legislative agency was
established with the authority to invalidate rules, the Attorney General was of
the opinion that this too would be unconstitutional because of the absence of
prescribed standards which are necessary when delegating legislative authority.
The opinion cited Clintonville Transfer Co. v. P.S.C., 248 Wis. 59, 21 N.W.2d
5 (1945) as authority on this point. Since a rule has the force and effect of
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trary to Article IV, Section 17 of the WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION,
which provides in part that "no law shall be enacted except by bill."
Following the receipt of the Attorney General's opinion, the Rule
Making Committee recommended repeal of the section in question
and this was incorporated into the recently enacted Administrative
Procedure Act.9
In addition to investigating the merits of clearance procedures in
existence in Wisconsin, the Rule Making Committee of the Wisconsin
Legislative Council studied other arrangements which might be utilized.
One potential clearance procedure which was considered by the Com-
mittee was the establishment of a court of administrative appeals or an
adjudication board for each of the large agencies in the state. A body
of this type would apparently have review authority in addition to its
clearance functions. This approach, however, is not common in the
United States and the Committee did not explore the many facets of
such an arrangement because of the doubtful constitutionality of the
plan.10
Another possibility investigated by the Committee was the creation
of an independent agency similar to the California Department of
Administrative Procedures. The clearance authority of such an agency
appears to be primarily restricted to the form of rules rather than to
their substance or legality. The Committee declined to recommend
the creation of such an agency since it felt that the functions of the
agency could be adequately carried out by existing Wisconsin agencies
such as the Legislative Reference Library and the Revisor of Statutes."'
Although the Rule Making Committee refused to recommend either
of the two possibilities mentioned above, it did recommend the crea-
tion of a new body which in the future may play an important role
in the clearance stage of the rule making process. The new Admin-
istrative Procedure Act provides for the creation of a Legislative Re-
view Committee.12 This body has advisory powers only and can be
regarded as a "watch-dog" committee. It is composed of 2 senators
and 3 assemblymen,'13 and its purpose is to promote proper rules and
to foster better understanding on the part of the public with respect
to administrative rules. The Committee is authorized to hear and in-
vestigate complaints, to subpoena witnesses and to make recommenda-
law, it was noted, Wis. CoNsT., Art. IV, §17, applies and a rule cannot be
changed except by a bill.
9 See: Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221 §12.
10 See: WIScONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part I, Dec. 1954, p. 6.
11 Ibid.
12 Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.041.
13 The members are selected in the same fashion as standing committees of the
two houses of the legislature. Terms are two years in duration. The com-
mittee will meet at the call of its chairman, or upon a call signed by two of
its members, or upon a call signed by five members of the legislature.
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tions stemming from its findings. A biennial report of its activities
and recommendations is to be made.
B. CLEARANCE OF CONSERVATION RuL.~s
Looking specifically at the Conservation Commission, it can be said
that only two of the clearance procedures outlined- clearance by the
Attorney General and by the Governor -have been utilized regarding
rules of that agency. What effect the newly created Legislative Review
Committee may have on conservation rules the future alone will tell.
Clearance by the Attorney General The requirement that all
conservation rules (with the exception of emergency rules when ap-
proved by the Assistant Director and the Director) be cleared with
the Attorney General in regard to form and legality is relatively unique
in that it is the result of Department action spelled out in the Con-
servation Director's letter of February 2, 1950,14 rather than being a
statutory requirement. Additional instructions of the Director relating
to clearance by the Attorney General state: "unless, because of the
nature of the order and the time element involved, immediate action
by the Attorney General is required, three days must be allowed to
lapse before inquiry is made as to the progress of the matter in the
Attorney General's office." It is the responsibility of the Assistant
Director to make such an inquiry.15
In practice, the Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Con-
servation Commission and Department rather than writing a letter of
approval merely signs a small mimeographed form which is attached
to the draft of the rule submitted to him. His comments, if any, are
normally written on this form. However, if for some reason, a lengthy
commentary would become necessary, a separate letter would be pre-
pared which would be filed with the rule in the files of the Conserva-
tion Department. Since the procedure for drafting conservation rules
is thoroughly formalized, and since the Director's letter requires the
Department's counsel to draft the form of the final rule, there is
seldom any necessity for the Attorney General to make any extensive
comments regarding the form of the rule. There is no evidence in the
Department's files, and no representative of the Department can recall
any instance in which the Attorney General refused to approve a com-
plete rule either by formal or informal opinion. There have, however,
been infrequent occasions when the Attorney General has suggested
that some portion of a rule be redrafted because its wording might
conceivably be declared illegal.
For example, regarding a rule governing conduct in state parks,16
the comment stated that the Atttorney General, "would suggest that in
14 See: General Letter of the Director, No. 227, July 10, 1953.
15 Ibid.
16 Rule No. M-173 (Rev. 1) (1939). See also: Rule No. M-173 (Rev. 3) (1950).
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Sec. 11 the words 'in an improper manner' be changed to read, 'in a
disorderly manner.' Impropriety is not a crime and should not be
made such by a Conservation Commission order." The rule was re-
drafted to incorporate the suggestion. In another instance,17 the com-
ments of the: Attorney General read, "Would suggest that attention
be called to the portion revised, par. (e), by underscoring same." This
suggestion also was followed. In at least one instance the Attorney
General called attention to a typographical error in the draft of the
rule 8 which was corrected in the final draft
In several jurisdictions where administrative rules are submitted
to the Attorney General for clearance as to their form and legality,
Professor Heady has noted that a tendency appears to exist for the
Attorney General to disapprove of a rule because he disagrees with
its substantive provisions.19 A complete survey by the present writer
of the comments and suggestions by the Attorney General regarding
conservation rules in Wisconsin fails to reveal the existence of such a
tendency in this state. This perhaps can be explained by the fact that
in Wisconsin conservation rules are cleared through the Attorney
General's office as a result of a policy adopted by the Conservation
Department itself. In the states where the practice outlined by Pro-
fessor Heady exists, clearance of rules through the Attorney General's
office is required by statute.
It seems clear, however, that the office of the Attorney General
plays a part in conservation policy formulation which may eventually
take the form of rules, through the issuance by the Attorney General's
Department of formal opinions, informal opinions or so-called law
memoranda, and verbal opinions on matters of law affecting the Com-
mission and the Department. Formal opinions are, of course, printed
and bound annually, thus forming a permanent record. Duplicate
copies of informal opinions, or law memoranda (whose headings,
since 1951, carry the statement that the views expressed below are
only those of the Assistant Attorney General writing it and should not
be quoted as an Attorney General's opinion) are kept on file in the
office of the Attorney General. The original typed copy is sent to the
conservation official who requested it. A comparison of these opinions
kept on file in the Attorney General's office and in the files of the
Conservation Department, indicates that the conservation files have
a most incomplete number of this type of opinions issued since 1951.
The most difficult opinions stemming from the Attorney General's
17 Rule No. M-40 (Rev. 4) (1944).
18 Rule No. M-102 (1941).
19 See: F. Heady, Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States, 12 PuB.
ADMnT. REv. 10 (1952) Heady, Administrative Procedure Legislation in the




Department to pinpoint are the so-called verbal opinions. Discussions
with various Assistant Attorneys General indicate that such opinions
normally take the form of answering a telephone query on a point
of law by merely citing the statute governing it. A study of the con-
servation files, however, indicates that occasionally oral opinions go
beyond the scope outlined by representatives of the Attorney General's
Department and result in policies which might be termed informal
rule making.
For example, in a letter dated October 7, 1948, Mr. G. S. Hadland
of the Conservation Department wrote Mr. Leonard Tomczyk, also
of the Department, in Ashland, the following:
"Yesterday your supervisor, Mr. Allen Hanson, and myself
contacted Mr. Roy Tulane of the Attorney General's Office
relative to the tagging of deer hides from the Indian reservation.
Pleased be advised that this Department will not tag deer hides
to be sold off from the Indian reservation as we feel it would
open the way for a lot of illegal traffic in venison."
Ten years earlier, the minutes of the law enforcement division of
the Department for April 18, 1939, contain what is titled a verbal
opinion of the Attorney General's Department with regard to a citi-
zen's official activity. A note is appended to this opinion stating merely
that the opinion was copied. The opinion states:
"A conservation warden has no authority to deputize inasmuch
as the conservation warden's credentials in an official capacity
are subject to the provisions of chapter 16.
"A sheriff or deputy sheriff may deputize a conservation warden
as a citizen. When a conservation warden is acting as such
emergency deputy the county shall be responsible for his activi-
ties and shall be liable for any injury which may result from
such activity.
"... the state pays transportation costs of conservation war-
dens while on official duty, but the warden is responsible for
any injury to his car which may result from such line of duty.
"... in view of the ruling of the Attorney General's offiice with
regard to the recovery of a portion of paid fines as informer
fees by a deputy sheriff, no distinction is made between a
deputy sheriff and special deputy sheriff."
The role of the Attorney General's Office extends beyond the field
of rule making to encompass other aspects of conservation policy
formulation. At the Conservation Commission meeting of May 14,
1954, Mr. Sprecher of the Department informed the Commission of
the circumstances surrounding Bill 8006, introduced into the United
States House of Representatives by Representative Alvin O'Konski
of Wisconsin. The provisions of the bill which sought to safeguard
the rights of certain land owners in Wisconsin were being studied by
the Wisconsin Attorney General, Mr. Sprecher explained. Assistant
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Attorney General Tulane, Mr. Sprecher noted, had asked him to re-
quest that the Commission withhold formal action either favoring or
opposing the measure until the Attorney General had an opportunity
to complete his study. The Commission agreed to forego action pend-
ing completion of the Attorney General's analysis. 20 Three months
later the Commission was informed that "It was the opinion of the
state's Attorney General that the bill does not furnish sufficient relief
to Wisconsin landowners . . . but at any rate some relief will be pro-
vided by it." The Commission thereupon voted unanimously to support
the bill.
2 1
Clearance by the Governor. The only statutory clearance re-
quirement for conservation rules provides that rules governing the
open and closed seasons and bag limits on fish and game must be
approved by the Governor.2 2 This provision dates from the legislation
in 1933 which first enabled the Conservation Commission to establish
such rules.2 3 The rationale behind this requirement, various repre-
sentatives of the Department believe, was that because of the highly
controversial nature of this type of rule, it was thought that persons
who disagreed with the Commission should have an opportunity to
carry their grievances to the Governor.2 4 While the Governor norm-
ally approves the recommendations of the Conservation Commission,
there have been occasional instances where he has exercised his pre-
rogative to veto a rule.
An example of the Governor's rejection of rules adopted by the
Conservation Commission can be seen in the controversy in 1948 over
an any-deer season. During that year a committee appointed by the
executive council of the Conservation Congress to represent the Con-
gress made an extensive study of the deer situation and reported
unanimously in favor of an any-deer season .2  The Department recom-
mended an any-deer season, the Conservation Congress recommended
an any-deer season and the Commission recommended an any-deer
season.2 6 The rule establishing the any-deer season, however, was not
approved by Governor Rennebohm.2 7 In the Governor's letter to the
Conservation Commission, July 24, 1948, in which the Governor's
disapproval was formalized, the Governor acknowledged that all the
20 See: Conservation Conznission Minutes, May 14, 1954, p. 19.
21 Conservation Commission Minutes, August 13, 1954, p. 9.
22WIs. STATS. (1953) §29.174(5).
23 Wis. LAWS 1933, c. 152.
24 See also: WIscoNsIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADmINISTRATIvE RULE
MAIUNG, Vol. II, Part II, Dec. 1954, p. 63.25 See: Unanimous Report of the Wisconsin Conservation Congress Deer Com-
mittee, Approved by the Executive Conservation Council, April 10, 1948.
26 See: July Conservation Commission Meeting, WIscoNSIN CONSERVATION BUL-
LETiN, Sept. 1948, Vol. 13, pp. 28-29.
27 See: August Conservation Coinvission Meeting, WISCONSIN CONSERVATION
BULLETIN, Oct. 1948, Vol. 13, p. 28.
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conservation agencies in the state favored the Commission rule. The
Governor, however, the letter pointed out, was also aware of Joint
Resolution 54,S of the 1947 Legislature :28
".. . which recommended that the Conservation Commission
adhere to and reaffirm the policy of the state governing the
killing of deer -that an order by the Conservation Commission
authorizing the killing of deer of either sex must first be ap-
proved by the county board of any county affected by such an
order ... The Conservation Commission followed the recom-
mendations of the Conservation Congress but rejected the
recommendations of the state legislature."
After several months of indecision on the part of the Conservation
Commission, it finally decided to adopt a rule establishing a fork-
homed buck season similar to the ones that had existed in the past.
This rule was quickly approved by the Governor. 29
An earlier and slightly different example of the powers of the
Governor over clearing Conservation Commission rules occurred in
1937. Governor Phillip LaFollette in this instance amended a con-
servation rule so that instead of providing for a five-day deer season
as the rule originally stipulated, the season was reduced to three days.
The Governor claimed he was acting in the interest of conservation.3"
Since 1952, however, it is doubtful if a Governor can use his powers
to approve conservation rules in this fashion. Upon the request of
then-Director Ernest Swift the Attorney General in July, 1952, ruled
that the Governor of Wisconsin has no power to approve in part and
reject in part Conservation Commission rules.3 1 Inasmuch as the
statute did not specifically authorize him to reject portions, of an ad-
ministrative rule, the Governor must, the opinion stated, approve the
rule in whole or reject it entirely.3 2 The Attorney General could find
no case law in Wisconsin relating to the Governor's powers to approve
administrative rules. He noted, however, that the general rule3 3 states
that unless the CONSTITUTION so specifies, the Governor has no power
to alter a law, but must merely approve it or veto it. The WIscoNs N
28 For the text of this letter see: Milwaukee Journal, July 24, 1948. See also:
Wisconsin State Journal, July 24, 1948; Green Bay Press-Gazette, July 24,
1948. For comments lauding the governor's action see: Milwaukee Sentinel,
July 26, 1948; Wisconsin State Journal, July 27, 1948. For comments critical
of the governor's action see: R. G. Lynch, Maybe I'm Wrong, Milwaukee
Journal, July 25, 1948; Green Bay Press-Gazette, August 27, 1948.
29 See: September Conservation Commission Meeting, WISCONSIN CONSERVATION
BULLETIN, Nov. 1948, Vol. 13, p. 29.
30 See: Milwaukee Journal, Oct. 5, 1937.
3141 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 206 (1952) In this case, Lieutenant Governor Smith, acting
in the absence of Governor Kohler vetoed part of an order prohibiting the use
of rifles on upland and migratory birds.32 For a newspaper account of this opinion by the attorney general see: Sheboygan
Press, July 9, 1952.
3 59 C. J. 583, §13.
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CONSTITUTION only authorizes the use of the item veto in reference
to appropriations bills, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held 4
that the item veto may only be used for appropriations bills, the
Attorney General's opinion pointed out. The action of the Governor,
the opinion concluded, in approving or rejecting parts of administra-
tive rules would be a form of the item veto, and administrative rules
must be regarded in the same light as statute law. There seems little
doubt that this opinion places significant limitations on the clearance
powers of the Governor in the rule making process.
During the 1953 session of the Legislature, Bill No. 106,A. was
introduced into the assembly by Assemblyman Zellinger. It would
have specifically permitted the Governor to approve parts of a bill,
thus legalizing the procedures attacked by the previously mentioned
opinion of the Attorney General. During its March meeting of 1953,
when the Conservation Commission was planning its stand on various
proposals before the Legislature affecting conservation, Commissioner
Smith criticized the Zellinger bill. Smith moved that the Commission
object to this bill and that this objection be presented to the Assembly
committee immediately.3 This motion carried and the Zellinger meas-
ure was not enacted.
Because of his official position the Governor can sometimes play a
significant part in other phases of the conservation rule making pro-
cess. An especially interesting example of this occurred in 1955 con-
cerning the always controversial rule fixing the opening date for the
hunting of waterfowl. Such a rule, of course, must always conform
to regulations adopted by the Secretary of Interior in accordance
with provisions of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act,3 6 which
fixes the maximum number of days in the waterfowl season.
The Conservation Commission regularly is faced by a dilemma in
determining an opening date on waterfowl hunting because of Wis-
consin's geographic location. Hunters from northern counties insist
on an early opening date, but if the Commission follows their wishes,
hunters in the southern counties (where normally the shooting should
be the best) will get no opportunity to hunt the northern flights of
birds, since the season will be closed by the time these birds migrate
to the southern counties. On the other hand, if a late opening date is
set by a Commission rule, the northern hunters will get little or no
shooting because the earlier freeze-up of waters in those areas forces
the ducks to migrate before the season is open.
The ideal solution would be for the Commission to zone the state
so that the maximum season permitted by Interior Department regu-
3 State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936).
35 Conservation Commission Minutes, March 27, 1953, p. 22.
36 16 U.S.C.A. 718.
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lations could be divided to permit an early season in northern counties
and a later season for the southern counties. The Interior Department,
however, has refused to permit such zoning. Moreover, debates over
the opening date of the waterfowl season were especially bitter during
the meeting of the Twentieth Conservation Congress in June, 1955,' 7
when a late opening date for the waterfowl season was finally recom-
mended.
In July, 1955, Governor Walter Kohler stepped into the picture.
The Governor, in a letter to Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay,
dated July 14, 1955, summarized the problems besetting Wisconsin
and other states with similar geographic locations caused by the
Interior Department's reluctance to permit a system of zoned water-
fowl seasons within a state. He pointed out the "intense public interest"
in this subject demonstrated by the delegates to the Conservation Con-
gress. The Governor then went on to explain that:
"During the past several years the state of Wisconsin has shown
its interest consistently in a further study of the matter of zon-
ing individual states through the medium of the Mississippi and
the National Flyway Councils. This subject was considered by
our Conservation Commission at its meeting on Friday, July 8,
at which time they formally requested the executive office to
exert every effort possible to obtain experimental zoning for
waterfowl in Wisconsin for the 1955 season. Because Wiscon-
sin is a northern flyway state, and therefore, has no wintering
population of waterfowl, it does not appear that zoning will re-
sult in any great increase in kill.
We would very much appreciate consideration by your office
of this important request which has been made by the Wisconsin
Conservation Commission."
Within one month following receipt of the Governor's letter the
Interior Department acted. While it still did not permit a zoned season,
it did authorize the extension of Wisconsin's waterfowl season to an
unprecedented 70 days. Of course, whether or not the Interior De-
partment's action was primarily traceable to the Governor's letter is a
matter of speculation. However, Guido Rahr, chairman of the Wis-
consin Conservation Commission addressed a letter to the Governor
thanking him for his efforts in securing the long season. Rahr said
the 15-day increase in the season not only permitted the northern
counties to have their usual early opening date, but gave the southern
hunters extra time as the end of the season neared.3 8 "We feel this
season will not jeopardize our migratory waterfowl population," Rahr
concluded, "but will give all sections of the state a better opportunity
to enjoy this form of outdoor recreation."
3 See: Wisconsin State Journal, June 7 and 8, 1955.
38 See: Wisconsin State Journal, August 20, 1955.
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II. DELAYED EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES
A. GENERAL PRACTICES
Traditionally, the idea of a delayed effective date is to make rules
available to the public before such rules become effective. It is also
important, however, to keep the period between the adoption and
effective date of a rule as short as possible so as not to impede the
effective administration of the law.3 9 The general rule in Wisconsin
prior to the legislative enactment of 1955 was that rules become effec-
tive on the day after their publication in the official state newspaper,
unless the statutes specifically prescribed a different effective date or
medium of publication.4" Moreover, the statutes pertaining to indi-
vidual agencies often prescribed a later date.4 ' It is interesting to note
that the statutes of California, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio and South Dakota provide a uniform delayed effective date for
all rules issued by the administrative agencies of the individual states,
with exceptions usually made for emergency situations. 42
B. CONSERVATION COMMISSION PROCEDURES
At least two specific provisions in the statutes governing conserva-
tion regulations and dealing with the effective date of rules should be
pointed out here. One provides that all rules dealing with fish and
game regulations will be effective following publication in the official
state paper and any other newspapers that the Commission may deem
feasible fairly to advise the individuals affected by the rule. 43 The
other deals in general with rules adopted by the Commission and stipu-
lates that they must be published in at least three papers of wide
circulation in the territory affected, at least one week prior to the date
the rule becomes effective. The one exception to this requirement is
emergency rules, concerning which the statute authorizes the com-
mission to give such notice, "as it deems feasible" prior to the rule's
effective date.4
4
39 The staff of the Legislative Council Committee on Rule Making has, however,
pointed out some of the disadvantages of a delayed effective date. First, it was
felt exceptions should be made for emergency situations. Second, a delayed
effective date, the staff thought, would probably fail to achieve its purpose
unless it was integrated with a positive publication requirement, third, it was
pointed out that a real limitation on statutory prescriptions of all effective
dates (delayed or otherwise) is that many rules are merely codifications of
agency practices or interpretations. In such cases the requirement for a de-
layed effective date, in particular, needlessly bogs down administrative action.
See: WIscoNsIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Problem Area Report No. 3, PROVIDING
PUBLICITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RuLEs, July 8, 1954, pp. 38-40.40WIs. STATS. (1953) §227.03(2).4 1 For examples of the specific provisions relating to a variety of Wisconsin
agencies see: Preliminary Report to the 1953 Legislature by the Special Joint
Committee on Rule Making, May 1953, pp. 22-23 and Appendix B.
42 For the provisions and citations of the statutes of other states relating to this
and other related stages in the rule making process see: Ibid. Appendix D.
43 See: WiS. STATS. (1953) §29.174(5).
44 WIS. STATS. (1953) §23.09(9).
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C. EFFECTS OF THE REVISED ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The new Administrative Procedure Act alters the general pro-
vision dealing with effective dates of rules as set forth in Wis. STATS.
(1953), Chapter 227. The new law provides in general that a rule is
effective on the first day of the month following its publication in the
Wisconsin ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AND REGISTER.45 Four major excep-
tions to this general requirement, however, are set forth. The general
requirement does not apply if: (1) the statute pursuant to which the
rule was adopted prescribes a different effective date,46 (2) a later date
is prescribed by the agency in a statement filed with the rule, (3) the
rule is a validly adopted emergency rule, (4) the publication of the
issue of the REGISTER of which the rule is part is delayed beyond the
end of the month in which such REGISTER was designated for publi-
cation. In this event, the rule does not become effective until the day
following the true date of publication which the Revisor of Statutes
in this eventuality is required to stamp on the title page of each copy
of that particular REGISTER. The section concludes by noting that the
"date of publication" refers to the date when copies of the REGISTER
first are mailed to persons entitled by law to receive them.
The effects of the new Act on conservation rules in this area is not
entirely clear. Section 29.174(5) of the revised Act alters the publi-
cation requirements and the effective date of conservation rules to
conform to the general provisions of the revised Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. This is accomplished by abolishing the provisions in old
Section 29.174(5) providing that a rule affecting fish and game seasons
becomes effective after publication in the state paper and any other
papers the Commission may deem feasible fairly to advise the residents
of the communities affected by such rules. However, the provisions
of Wis. STATS. (1953), Section 26.12(1) relating to forest protection
district rules remain unchanged by the new Act in respect to publica-
tion requirements and effective dates.
Bill 5,S. as originally approved by the Legislative Council, repealed
the provisions of WIs. STATS. (1953), Section 23.09(9). This section
provides that all rules of the Commission shall be published in at least
three papers of wide circulation in the territory to be affected at least
one week prior to the rule's effective date, except in cases of emer-
gency. The general provisions of Section 227.026 of the new Act
would thus have applied to these rules of the Commission insofar as
publication and effective date are concerned. However, Amendment
2,S. to Bill 5,S., sponsored by Senator Paul Rogan, which abolished
the provision repealing Section 23.09(9), was enacted by the legisla-
45 WIs. LAws 1955, c. 221, §227.026.
46This would appear to exempt the great bulk of conservation rules from the
general effective date provisions of the new law.
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ture and signed by the Governor. Thus Section 23.09(9) continues to
have the force and effect of law.
A problem which arises as a result of certain inherent ambiguities
in the new law is, does Section 23.09(9) prescribe a different effective
date than that contained in Section 227.026? If it is assumed that the
language of Section 23.09(9) ("All rules ... of the commission shall
be published in at least three newspapers ... in the territory affected
at least one week prior to the date such rules ... became effective.")
meets the requirement of Section 227.026 (a) (which states that a rule
is effective on the first day of the month following publication in the
ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTER, unless "The statute pursuant to which the
rule was adopted prescribes a different date,") then it appears likely
that a different effective date may be set by Section 23.09(9). Some
might argue, however, that the words "at least one week prior to the
date such rules become effective," do not constitute prescribing an
effective date within the meaning of Section 227.026(a).
The Legislative Council staff, it should be noted, in its Memoran-
dum on the Effects of Amendment 2,S. to Bill 5,S. pointed out that
the Conservation Department counsel said that Section 23.09(9) had
always been construed by that agency to apply only to rules having
local effect. As a result, the only rules adopted under this provision
are those establishing fish and game refuges. From this it might
appear that any problems which in the future might result from the
ambiguity of the two sections referred to above would be, at best, of
minor importance. This is probably true. However, if it is assumed
that Section 23.09(9) establishes a different effective date than that
outlined in Section 227.026, and if it is assumed that the local papers
alluded to in the former section fulfill constitutional publication re-
quirements, it is entirely possible for a local conservation rule adopted
under 23.09(9) to become effective before it is published in the AD-
MINISTRAT IVE REGISTEP. Thus the attempts of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act to achieve uniformity of practice could be defeated in this
instance.
D. EMERGENCY RULES
Under normal conditions it is desirable to require a period of time
between the adoption of a rule and its effective date to enable the
public to learn of the rule's provisions. Periodically, however, occa-
sions arise which do not permit a delay between the adoption and the
effective date of a rule because of their seriousness. Emergency situ-
ations such as the outbreak of a serious plant or animal disease or the
existence of a forest fire hazard clearly demand prompt administra-
tive action, and account for the existence of emergency rules. While
the general provision of WISCONSIN STATUTES, Chapter 227, prior to
1955 did not spell out in detail the standards regarding emergency
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rules, a variety of such provisions existed in the statutes affecting spe-
cific agencies.47 The provision authorizing the promulgation of emer-
gency rules by the Conservation Commission has just been noted.
The need for permitting an agency to adopt emergency rules
(which generally by-pass a number of phases of the rule making pro-
cess) was recognized by the Legislative Council Committee on Ad-
ministrative Rule Making. However, the Committee noted one danger
inherent in the emergency rule procedure. It was pointed out, for
example, that in Michigan, where the provisions of the administrative
procedure act relating to delayed effective dates make an exception for
emergency rules, the state agencies generally make a practice of adopt-
ing more and more rules as emergency rules to get around the require-
ments of the delayed effective date.
48
The provisions of the new Administrative Procedure Act are
aimed both at permitting the adoption of necessary emergency rules
and at forestalling the inordinate use of the emergency rule procedure
to circumvent the general requirements of a delayed effective date. The
enactment authorizes the use of emergency rules if the public peace,
health, safety and welfare so require. 49 Unlike regular rules, emergency
rules will take effect upon publication in the official state paper. Con-
stitutional publication requirements, the Committee believed, will thus
be satisfied, and the rule can take effect without delay.50 This section
also makes provision for certain supplemental notice procedures in
connection with emergency rules. Copies of such a rule must be filed
according to law and also mailed to members of the Legislature, and
the rule will be published in summary form in the "notice" section of
the ADmINISTRATIvE REGISTER.
The draftsman's note following Section 227.027 of the revised
Act states: "Sub (2) prescribes certain supplementary publicity pro-
cedures, but the validity of the rule is not dependent on compliance
with these procedures." (Emphasis added) When queried by this
writer as to the significance of this statement, the Legislative Council
staff commented that the choice of the emphasized word may be mis-
leading, and that it would have been more accurate to say, the effective
date of the rule is not dependent on compliance with these procedures.
However, an additional problem exists regarding the wording of this
section. Although it requires that emergency rules must be filed accord-
ing to Section 227.023, nowhere in the revised Act is there a time
47 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, Dec. 1954, Appendix V-B.
48 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Problem Area Report, No. 3, PROVIDING
PUBLICITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, July 8, 1954, p. 38.
4 Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.027.
50 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING,
Vol. II, Part I, Dec. 1954, p. 11.
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limit set for filing emergency rules. This is no real problem so far as
regular rules are concerned since they must be filed with the Revisor
of Statutes before they can be published. On the other hand, it is
entirely possible for an emergency rule to be published before it is
filed and since no time limit is set for filing emergency rules, the
effectiveness of the filing requirement set forth in Section 227.027(2)
is almost completely negated.
It is important to note that an emergency rule remains in effect only
for a period of 120 days, unless during this time the regular statutory
requirements of the rule making process are fulfilled. It would appear
that the emergency rule making authority of the Conservation Com-
mission as outlined in Wis. STATS. (1953), Chapter 2-3.09(9) would
be governed by this provision in Section 227.027(1) of the new Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.
Under the provisions of the revised Act it would appear entirely
possible for the Conservation Commission to adopt almost all of its
rules establishing game seasons as emergency rules. This is true be-
cause the seasons established on game species seldom are longer than
120 days. If this practice were followed, however, it would defeat
the intent of the emergency rule provision in the new Act. Moreover,
since approval by the Governor is required for emergency conserva-
tion rules as well as for regular rules,51 the Governor could disapprove
of a rule which he felt was promulgated as a result of faulty pro-
cedures. The Conservation Director, however, in his letter to all super-
visory personnel of January 4, 1956, emphasized that provisions of the
revised Act dealing with emergency rules would be used very seldom
by the Conservation Department and Commission.
IlL. AMDINIsTRATIvE REVIEW OF RULES
A. GENERAL PRACTICES
Wisconsin law sets forth procedures for reviewing administrative
rules both by the courts and by the administrative agency responsible
for the rule prior to the adoption of the new Administrative Procedure
Act of 1955. In addition to the general statutes applying to all agencies,
other statutes provided special procedures for certain agencies such as
the Department of Agriculture, the Public Service Commission, the
Insurance Department, Banking Department, Saving and Loan De-
partment and the Department of Securities.52 Even in the presence
of these specific provisions, the Legislative Council Committee on
Administrative Rule Making found that with the exception of the
5 1 WIs. STATS. (1953) §29.174(5).
52WIs. STATS. (1953) §§93.19; 196.405; 200.11; 203.32(16); 204.54; 115.09;
220.035(2) (b); 215.60(8); 189.22. For a general discussion of administrative




Industrial Commission, most requests for modification or agency re-
view of rules were informal and were handled informally by the
agency involved.
5 3
It was pointed out in the discussion of initiation of rule making,
that though Wis. STATS. (1953), Section 227.04 requires each agency
to provide by rules the form and procedure for individual petitions
for promulgation, amendment or repeal of any rule, few agencies have
adopted rules of procedures governing the submission of such peti-
tions. Although this provision has proved to be ineffective, the pro-
cedures outlined in Section 227.04 must be regarded as establishing
one form of administrative review of rules.
B. DECLARATORY RULINGS
Prior to 1955, another section of the statutes pertained to ad-
ministrative review of rules. This provision, which established de-
claratory ruling procedures stated :54
"Any agency may, on petition by any interested person, and
shall upon reference of a case in accordance with the provisions
of Sec. 227.05, issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the ap-
plicability to any person, property, or state of facts of any rule or
statute enforced by it. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the
form, content and procedure for submission, consideration and
disposition of such petitions. Full opportunity for hearing shall
be afforded to interested parties. A declaratory ruling shall
bind the agency and all parties to the proceedings on the state of
facts alleged unless it is altered or set aside by a court. A ruling
shall be subject to review in the circuit court in the manner pro-
vided for the review of administrative decisions in contested
cases."
The effectiveness of declaratory rulings is dependent on the will-
ingness of agencies to issue them. The Legislative Council Committee
on Administrative Rule Making, however, found that only 12 of the
42 agencies studied had complied with that portion of this statute
requiring each agency to prescribe by rules the form and procedure
for submission and disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings.53
The Committee's investigation further revealed that only 3 agencies
- the Public Service Commission, the Board of Health, and the Indus-
trial Commission - had ever received formal petitions for declaratory
53 See: WIscoNsIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, Dec. 1954, pp. 72-73.
54 WIs. STATS. (1953) §227.06. Wisconsin is the only state to have a provision in
its Administrative Procedure Act permitting agencies to issue declaratory rul-
ings. See: Wisconsin Legislative Council Committee on Administrative Rule
Making, Limitations on Administrative Discretion, May 27, 1954, p. 13. For a
general discussion of declaratory rulings see: K. C. Davis, Administrative Law,
ST. PAUL, 1951, pp. 170-175.
55 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, Dec. 1954, p. 74.
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rulings. Informal inquiries relating to the applicability of a rule or a
specific statute to a particular fact situation or person, however, had
been received occasionally by several other agencies.
The only case to reach the Wisconsin Supreme Court in which
declaratory rulings were at issue involved such an informal inquiry.
The situation concerned a retired state employe who had written a
letter to the annuity and investment board requesting a change to
another payment plan under the state retirement system. This request
was denied. In the interim, however, the employe died and his ad-
ministrator brought a petition in the Circuit Court for Dane County
to review the agency's action denying the request. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held with respect to a challenge of the Circuit Court's
jurisdiction that the letter requesting the change in payment plan could
be construed as a petition for a declaratory ruling despite its inform-
ality and its failure to make any reference to a declaratory ruling.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, the Circuit Court had jurisdic-
tion to review the agency's action in considering the petition."
Because of its discovery that the majority of Wisconsin agencies
had not complied with the provisions of Wis. STATS. (1953), Section
227.06, regarding the adoption of rules setting forth the procedures
for declaratory ruling petitions, the Legislative Council Committee on
Administrative Rule Making recommended that such rules of pro-
cedure be written into the statutes.57 This recommendation became
part of the newly adopted Administrative Procedure Act.58
The first subsection of Section 227.06 of the revised Act is a re-
statement of the present law in that it authorizes all agencies to issue
declaratory rulings and to provide full opportunity for a hearing. Such
rulings bind all parties concerned on the state of facts alleged unless
the ruling is set aside by a court.
The second half of this section is new law, and spells out the pro-
cedural requirements for petitions for declaratory rulings. Such a
petition must be in writing and must indicate the name of the agency
concerned and the nature of the petition. It must also include a
reference to the rule or statute at issue and a concise statement of
facts describing the situation as to which the declaratory ruling is
requested, the reasons for the request and the person on whom the
ruling is sought to be made binding. The petition must be signed, and
verified by at least one signer, and if a person signs on behalf of a
corporation or association, this fact must be indicated. Moreover, it
must be filed with the administrative head of the agency. "Within
56 See: Kubista v. State Annuity and Investment Board, 257 Wis. 359, 43 N.W2d
470 (1950).
57 See: WIscoNSn LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADINISTRAT RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part I, Dec. 1954, p. 8.
58 Wis. LAws 1955, c. 221, §227.06.
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a reasonable time" after the petition has been received the agency
must either deny the petition in writing or schedule a hearing. If the
petition is denied the agency must "promptly" notify the petitioner of
this fact and include a brief statement of the reasons for the refusal.
When compared to the liberal interpretation of petitions for de-
claratory rulings evidenced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ku-
bista v. State Annuity and Investment Board, it might be speculated
that the new procedures set down in this statute may, by their
formality, make it more difficult for the public to obtain review of
agency action in declaratory ruling cases. For it would seem likely
that a layman might inadvertently but understandably omit from his
petition one of the procedural requirements spelled out in the statute.
However, whether this section will formalize procedures which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted to be most informal will ulti-
mately be left for that court to determine.
Another problem is still unresolved, however, regarding the role
of declaratory rulings in Wisconsin. It has been pointed out that the
effectiveness of declaratory rulings hinges on the willingness of agencies
to issue them. Moreover, the Wisconsin Legislature by specifically in-
cluding declaratory ruling provisions in its Administrative Procedure
Act has indicated a belief in the efficacy of such procedures in the
administrative process. Thus the question arises- is a refusual to
issue a declaratory ruling judicially reviewable? Wisconsin case law
affords no answer to this query, nor did the Legislative Council Com-
mittee on Administrative Rule Making go into this phase of the prob-
lem. However, the desirability of using declaratory rulings in appropri-
ate situations and the reluctance of agencies generally to consider
them might support arguments favoring judicial review of refusals to
issue such rulings.
One writer has explained that a restricted approach to judicial
review of refusals to issue declaratory rulings would be far from
making issuance of these rulings mandatory. "The discretion to issue
or not to issue would be the agency's and the court would upset that
discretion only for abuse."59 One major reason militates against re-
quiring agencies in all situations to grant declaratory rulings. Clarify-
ing the uncertainties at which a petition for a declaratory ruling is
aimed would often require extensive investigations by the agency.
Clearly, the agency rather than the regulated parties should determine
the use of the agency's resources. For all too frequently problems of
the present overtax the capacities of the best of agencies.
C. CONSERVATION COMMISSION PROCEDURES
Looking specifically at the Conservation Commission, it may be
59 Davis, op. cit., p. 175.
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said that petitions for modification or repeal of a rule may be made in
two ways. First, Commission policy permits direct submission of peti-
tions of this type to the Commission. They wili be considered by the
Commission in a manner which that body deems advisable and a hear-
ing may or may not be held. The second way in which petitions may
be made, of course, is through invocation of 'WIScONSIN STATUTES,
Chapter 227. Regardless of which form of the petition procedure out-
lined above is utilized, the petitioner is invited to appear at a meeting
of the Conservation Commission.
Although the Conservation Commission is one of only four agencies
in the state that reported it had ever received formal petitions for
adoption, amendment or repeal of rules, 60 it has not adopted rules for
submitting and acting on such petitions as outlined in Wis. STATS.
(1953), Section 227.04. However, procedures for petitioning the
Conservation Commission regarding the adoption, modification or re-
peal of certain rules are spelled out elsewhere in the statutes.61
The declaratory ruling procedures outlined in Wis. STATS. (1953),
Section 227.06, have not proved to be important in the rule making
process of the Conservation Commission. This is probably best indi-
cated by the fact that the Commission, representatives of the Depart-
ment state, has never received a petition for a declaratory ruling as to
the applicability of a particular rule. The explanation for the negligible
role of such rulings in the area of conservation can be traced, it
appears, to the fact that most Commission rules apply either to all or
very large groups of citizens of the state rather than to a small and
select clientele. If a petition for a declaratory ruling were made, how-
ever, representatives of the Department agree that the Director would
answer it. If the Director could not answer the petition, the Com-
mission would determine the rule's applicability. The Conservation
Commission, however, has not prescribed by rule the form, content
and procedure for submission, consideration and disposition of de-
claratory ruling petitions as spelled out in Wis. STATs. (1953), Section
227.06.
At least one instance has arisen in recent years where a formalized
declaratory ruling conceivably might have been issued. At its meeting
of February 19, 1954, the Commission was informed by Department
counsel that a petition of Roy Grant Jr. and Mary Cavanaugh had
been served on the Commission. Petitioners were attempting to attack
the Kutschenreuter private fish hatchery on the ground that Mr. Kut-
schenreuter did not hold title to the land.
rO See: Legislative Council Committee on Administrative Rule Making, Public
Participation in Rule Making, April 22, 1954, pp. 30-31.
61 See for example: Wis. STATs. (1953) §§29.174 (2) (3) (4) relating to rules
effecting fish and game seasons, and Wis. STATS. (1953) §§77.02(1) (2) regard-
ing rules fot forest crop lands.
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Department counsel informed the Commission that he had inspected
the deed and found it good.62 In the opinion of the counsel, peti-
tioners had not proceeded in accordance with the administrative re-
view provision of Wis. STATs. Chapter 227. Moreover, the peti-
tion had been served on the Commission rather than the Department.
Thus counsel recommended that the petition be referred to the De-
partment for review and proper action pursuant to law. The Com-
mission voted unanimously to refer the matter to the Department and
to the Attorney General's Office for the necessary action.63
At the outset of their subsequent investigation, the wording of the
petition, which was of a non-legal nature, caused difficulties for both
Department counsel and the Assistant Attorney General assigned to the
matter. Department counsel wrote of the petition that, "It appears to
be an objection to the renewal of . . . (a) private fish hatchery
license."' 64 The Assistant Attorney General noted in a letter of March
22, 1954 that he had "examined the so-called petition.., which appears
to be some form of a request to... deny a license. .. "
However, the Assistant Attorney General informed the Depart-
ment in his letter of March 22, 1954 that though the petition obviously
was not prepared by a lawyer and was somewhat difficult to follow, it
did raise some questions that should be cleared up before any final
disposition was made of the request. After listing these points in the
form of questions, he concluded, "It would appear that if the proper
answers are available for the issues raised above, this petition can
be disregarded."
The Department immediately instituted an investigation to obtain
the answers to the questions raised by the Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Charles N. Lloyd, who conducted the investigation for the De-
partment informed Mr. H. T. J. Cramer of his findings in a letter
dated April 9, 1954. These findings, the Attorney General stated in a
note on the Department file copy of the Lloyd memorandum, disposed
satisfactorily of the questions raised by him and the license applica-
tion appeared in order.
On this advice from the Assistant Attorney General, the Depart-
ment informed Mr. Grant in a letter of April 15, 1954 that there was
no basis on which to refuse to issue the license to Mr. Kutschenreuter.
The Department advised Mr. Grant that he could start action in the
62 In a letter to the Director dated January 22, 1954, counsel earlier had informed
the Director that Mr. Kutschenreuter had first been issued a license in 1946
and it had been regularly renewed. Department files revealed, the counsel con-
cluded, that Mr. Kutschenreuter had complied with statute law and Depart-
ment rules regarding filing reports on his operations and in making his appli-
cations for license renewal.
63 Conservation Commission Minutes, February 19, 1954, p. 3.




local courts if he felt the ownership of the land was improper. No
court action was started, and the entire matter never went back to the
Commission for further action.
It might be argued that here was a situation that should have been
handled specifically by declaratory ruling procedures. This is not to
suggest that there was anything substantively wrong with the disposi-
tion of this case. At the time this matter arose, however, the Com-
mission had not prescribed by rule the form, content and procedures
for submission and disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings.
Apart from this, analyzing this case is difficult because the record does
not make clear exactly why counsel for the Department felt the peti-
tion did not conform to procedures required in the Wisconsin Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Certainly, in light of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's reasoning in the Kubista case, it would be difficult
to maintain that this could not be regarded as a petition for a de-
claratory ruling merely because it was written in non-legal language or
because it made no reference to a declaratory ruling.
If an extremely narrow view of the declaratory ruling statute is
taken, it might be argued, of course, that since this case involved
licensing, it was on the order of a "contested case" dispute rather
than one involving a rule or statute. On the other hand, it might be
claimed that though the case was not disposed of by anything form-
ally entitled a declaratory ruling, what in fact was issued was basically
a declaratory ruling which ruled against petitioner, but informed him
that he had exhausted his administrative remedies and might now pro-
ceed in the courts. In either case, it seems clear that the function of a
declaratory ruling has not been fully appreciated in the administrative
process of the Wisconsin Conservation Commission and Department.
It can be concluded that the formal procedures outlined in the pre-
1955 Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act have not played a
significant part in administrative review of conservation rules. But
the procedures resulting from Commission policy, which are of a more
informal nature, provided an extremely important technique by which
rules of the Commission are reviewed by that agency. Under the
policy of the Commission, the petitioner merely appears before the
Commission at one of its regular meetings and makes known his views
regarding the modification, amendment or repeal of a rule. About the
only formality involved is for the petitioner to notify the Director of
his desire to appear, so that the Director may arrange a place on the
agenda for this matter. (The requirement to notify the Director is
not inflexible and under certain circumstances it will be waived.) The
Commission reserves the right to determine if the petitioner's pre-
sentation shall be oral or written. Normally, a limited oral presenta-
tion is permitted, unless previously scheduled Commission business
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prohibits the use of the time necessary for such a presentation. The
Commission, as previously noted, determines whether a separate hear-
ing shall be held to obtain the various opinions on a petition to amend
or repeal a rule.
There is ample evidence to indicate that the Commission is deeply
concerned with granting the widest leeway to those who petition that
body seeking review or reconsideration of rules. An example of the
informal procedures followed by the Commission which facilitate the
efforts of groups seeking administrative review of conservation rules
may be seen by an occurrence several years ago. At its July, 1953,
meeting the Commission was informed by the Director that officials
of the Town of Plum Lake had requested to appear before the Com-
mission to seek modification of a Commission rule. Chairman Guido
Rahr informed the Commission that these officials would be heard at
11:45 A.M. When that time arrived, the chairman inquired whether
any of the representatives from the Town of Plum Lake were present.
There was no response at that time. Periodically during the remainder
of the meeting, the chairman interrupted proceedings to inquire whether
the Plum Lake officials were present and ready to appear. The local
officials, however, did not put in an appearance at this meeting. 65
Another example of the Commission's concern with facilitating
administrative review of conservation rules must be noted. When
discussing the draft of the handbook on Commission policies and pro-
cedures which was being prepared by the Department, Commissioner
Smith observed that no provision authorizing the right of appeal to
the Commission was included in the draft. Thereupon, Smith moved
that an amendment be added to Administrative Directive and Trans-
mittal Letter No. 10 allowing any individual or group the right of
appeal to the Commission on a policy recommendation in cases where
the Director believes a proposed policy statement unnecessary or where
he disapproves of the prepared text. This motion was unanimously
adopted.6
6
The Commission is particularly sensitive to charges that it is im-
peding anyone seeking to challenge its policies. Mr. Wallace Grange
appeared before this body at its meeting of August, 1954, in connection
with his pending case in the Dane County Circuit Court testing the
legality of the Commission rule permitting managed goose hunting on
the Horicon Marsh. His suit against the Commission, Grange com-
plained, had been held up due to deliberate delays and obstruction by
Wisconsin conservation officials. Grange cited as an example of such
65 See: Conservation Commission Minutes, July 16, 1953, p. 8.
66 Conservation Commission Minutes, December 13, 1953, p. 9.
[Vol. 40
RULE MAKING PROCESS
obstruction the difficulty he had experienced in arranging for an ad-
verse examination of past-Director Swift.6 7
Following the Grange charges, Chairman Rahr instructed the De-
partment to make immediately accessable to Mr. Grange all available
materials on the subject so that the legal aspects of the controversy
could be determined without delay. Later in the meeting, the chairman
was to note that it was understood that if the case went against the
Commission in the Dane County Circuit Court, the hunt would be
stopped even before any appeal might be taken to a higher court 68
Commissioner Smith broke in to say that any delays in the case
should be blamed on an Assistant Attorney General and not on the
Department or Director. At the September meeting of the Com-
mission, Smith was to note that these remarks had been misconstrued
to be unduly critical of the Attorney General's Office and he asked
that the minutes of the last meeting containing his statements be modi-
fied to put his views in their proper perspective. 9
The effectiveness of the Commission-adopted procedure in bringing
about modification or repeal of existing rules or proposed rules in
their final form cannot be denied. However, it is difficult to generalize
as to the role of these procedures on all aspects of conservation. There
is some evidence that certain individuals or groups have been espe-
cially effective in obtaining alterations in rules.70
For example, various representatives of fishermen's groups in
Dodge County during the past few years have been successful in ob-
taining amendments to the rule abolishing the bag-limits on bullheads
throughout the state, so that a bag limit of 25 bullheads was fixed
for Beaver Dam Lake and Fox Lake in Dodge County.7' At its July,
1955 meeting, the Commission again adopted this amendment in the
face of recommendations by the Department and the Conservation
Congress favoring a statewide rule establishing a no bag-limit on bull-
heads. It is interesting to note, that while representatives of the Dodge
County group were present prior to the opening of the Commission
meeting in July and engaged in conversations with several commis-
sioners, they made no formal plea to amend the rule during the actual
meeting.
67 For a record of this incident see: Conservation Commission Minutes, August
13, 1954, p. 26.
6s Ibid., p. 32.
69 See: Conservation Commission Minutes, September 10, 1954, p. 2.
70 This should not be considered unusual in the administrative process. One
writer has noted when speaking of agencies in general that conferences of an
unofficial character may be a far more influential element of interest repre-
sentation in the determination of policy than are formal public hearings. See:
A. Leiserson, Administrative Regulation, CHIcAGO, 1942, pp. 54-55 and 89-92.
71 For a discussion of the pressures brought by the Beaver Dam Fishermen's
Club and the Fox Lake Fishermen's Club for retaining the bag limit on bull-
heads see: Conservation Commission Minutes, July 9, 1954, p. 18.
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D. EFFECTS OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The provisions of the new Administrative Procedure Act will not,
in fact, materially alter present practices relating to the administrative
review of Conservation Commission rules by the agency itself. While
it is true that the new Act alters the procedures to be followed con-
cerning declaratory ruling petitions, it has been stressed that petitions
for declaratory rulings have played little or no part in the administra-
tive review of conservation rules. Moreover, no change has been made
by the new Act in the specific statutes establishing procedures for
petitioning the Conservation Commission regarding the modification
or repeal of rules relating to fish and game seasons and forest crop
lands.7 2
The one significant change wrought by the new Act regarding
review of rules by administrative agencies relates to those situations
where the form of petition for amendment or repeal of a conservation
rule is not spelled out elsewhere in the statutes. It has been previously
noted that the new Act provides in such cases that any municipality
or any five persons having an interest in the rule may petition the
Commission requesting amendment or repeal of such rule .7  This
section clearly explains the form such petitions must take. "Within
a reasonable time" following receipt of such petition the Commission
must either deny the petition in writing or proceed with the requested
rule making. If the petition is denied, the Commission's letter of denial
must contain a "brief" explanation for the Commission action.
The changes instituted by this section, however, would seem to be
more apparent than real. Past practices of the Commission, while not
formalized, have been very liberal in permitting even a single individual
to appear before the Commission to request the modification or repeal
of its rules. The new law, though formalizing the petition procedures,
does not seem destined to permit any greater public participation in
initiating administrative review of conservation rules, although it may
well have this effect so far as the rules of other agencies are con-
cerned. The new law, however, would seem to assure the petitioner
of at least obtaining the satisfaction of receiving a formal letter ex-
plaining why his petition for amendment or repeal of a rule was
turned down by the Conservation Commission. Under past practices,
the reasons for the Commission's refusal to act were not always clear.
IV. SUMMARY
A number of states have adopted clearance requirements for ad-
ministrative rules which provide, in essence, that a rule cannot take
72See: Wis. STATS. (1953 §§29.174(2)(3)(4) and §77.02(1)(2). See also:
WIS. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.015(1).
73 Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.015.
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effect until it has been approved by an officer or agency which is not
connected with the agency adopting the rule. The officers or agencies
most frequently designated through which rules must be cleared are
the attorney general, the governor and the legislature (either as a
whole or through a special legislative review committee.) Wisconsin
has no general statute requiring clearance of rules by any officer or
agency.
All Wisconsin conservation rules with the exception of emergency
rules must be cleared through the Attorney General. This practice,
however, is the result of a policy adopted by the Conservation Depart-
ment and is not required by law. The only statutory clearance pro-
vision for conservation rules which existed prior to 1955 required
that rules governing the open and closed seasons and bag limits on
fish and game must be approved by the Governor.
The newly revised Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act, how-
ever, provides for the creation of a Legislative Review Committee to
act as a "watch-dog" over all administrative rules. The Committee has
advisory powers only, and its purpose is to promote proper rules and
to foster better understanding on the part of the public with respect to
administrative rules. It is, of course, still too early to determine the
role of this Committee in regard to conservation rules. Nonetheless,
it might be speculated that because of their controversial nature and
the large number of people affected by them, certain classes of con-
servation rules will, by their very nature, have a tendency to come to
the Committee's attention regularly.
The theory behind delayed effective dates for rules is that such a
delay permits a rule to be made available to the public before it be-
comes effective, thus forewarning the public of coming regulations.
Prior to the adoption of the revised Wisconsin Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the general rule was that administrative rules became
effective the day after publication in the official state newspaper unless
the statute specifically prescribed a different medium or effective date.
One statute relating to effective dates of conservation rules, before
1955, provided that all rules dealing with fish and game regulation
would take effect after publication in the official state paper and any
other papers that the Commission might deem advisable fairly to
advise the individuals affected by the rule. Another provision dealing
in general with rules of the Commission stipulated that they must be
published in at least three papers of wide circulation in the territory
affected at least one week prior to the date the rule became effective.
Emergency rules, however, are excepted from this requirement.
The revised Administrative Procedure Act now provides that in
general a rule is effective on the first day of the month following
publication in the ADmINIsTRATivE CODE AND REGISTER. Almost all
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conservation rules, with the exception of those establishing fish and
game refuges and forest protection districts will be governed by this
provision. In the latter two cases, additional publication of notice in
local newspapers is required.
Although it is normally desirable to require a delay between the
adoption of a rule and its effective date, certain situations such as the
outbreak of a serious plant or animal disease do not permit a delayed
effective date. To meet such exigencies, the revised Administrative
Procedure Act establishes procedures for promulgating emergency
rules. These rules may frequently bypass the hearing stage in the
rule making process, and become effective following publication
in the official state newspaper. Emergency rules, however, remain
in effect only 120 days unless during this period the regular statutory
requirements of the rule making process are fulfilled. This provision
is aimed at preventing the over-use of emergency rules to circumvent
the general requirements of a delayed effective date. Nonetheless, it
would be possible for the Conservation Commission to adopt almost
all of its rules governing game seasons as emergency rules, since such
seasons seldom are over 120 days in duration.
The original Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act provided
two major methods of administrative review of an agency's rules.
Wis. STATS. (1953), Section 227.04, required each agency to provide
by rules the form and procedure for individual petitions for amend-
ment, repeal or promulgation of any rule. However, very few agencies
(of which the Conservation Commission was not one) adopted rules
of procedure governing the submission of such petitions, and most
requests for modification of rules were received and handled by the
agency on an informal basis. The revised Administrative Procedure
Act spells out the necessary procedures governing the submission of
such petitions.
The second major method of administrative review contained in
the original Administrative Procedure Act was the authority granted
all agencies to issue declaratory rulings. The effectiveness of declara-
tory ruling procedures is dependent on the willingness of agencies to
issue them and the field study of the Legislative Council revealed that
only three agencies had ever received formal petitions for declaratory
rulings. The Conservation Commission was not one of these agencies.
The revised Administrative Procedure Act specifically outlines the
procedures to be followed and the form that a petition for a declaratory
ruling must take.
In addition to the procedures for administrative review outlined
in the Administrative Procedure Act, Conservation Commission policy
permits direct submission of petitions for modification or repeal of
conservation rules. They will be considered by the Commission in a
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manner which that body deems advisable. Few, if any, formal require-
ments govern this method of administrative review. While it is im-
possible to document the precise effectiveness of this method of re-
view, there is some indication that certain individuals and groups have
been especially effective in obtaining their wishes when using this
technique. It wo'uld appear, that in the absence of formal standards
governing this method of review, personality plays an important role.
